Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash -walras equilibria exist for large economies, even if utility functions are not quasi -concave and choice sets are not convex, which is the case in standard settings; the separation of the purchase from the sale of contracts and the pooling of the deliveries on contracts guarantee that the markets for commodities clear.
Introduction
The extension, by Hicks (1939) and then Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959) , of the notion of a commodity to encompass time, uncertainty and location allowed for a clear understanding of the scope of the main propositions of the theory of general competitive equilibrium; and it shifted the focus of research away from specific models and towards the essential, logical structure of the theory.
With commodities differentiated according to time, uncertainty and location, according to Radner (1968) , many trades are not feasible because of differences in information. The restricting of trades to commodities whose characteristics are common knowledge leads, following Radner (1972) , to an incomplete market: the objects of trade are not the commodities themselves, but contracts or assets for the delivery of commodities.
Even if trades in contracts are verifiable, the delivery of commodities need not be, which leaves room, according to Akerlof (1970) and Mirrlees (1999) , for strategic manipulation.
The approach in Mirrlees (1999) , which emphasizes the design of optimal contracts that reduce the possibility of strategic manipulation, has been the most influential; great effort has since been devoted to the study of game theoretic models of contracts between individuals with asymmetric information.
The purpose here is to reconsider and develop the approach in Akerlof (1970) : in a large market, what matters for an individual is not the choice of every other individual, but only the effect of these choices on the average deliveries of commodities.
Individuals exchange contracts in competitive markets. Simultaneously, they act strategically. Actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts.
The specification encompasses economies with asymmetric information. At a Nash -walras equilibrium individuals optimize given the prices of contracts and the actions of other individuals; and the markets for commodities, as well as for contracts, clear.
A Nash -walras equilibrium is, simultaneously, a walrasian equilibrium for a market economy, as in Arrow and Debreu (1954) and an equilibrium for a non -cooperative game as in Nash (1950) . In Ghosal and Polemarchakis (1997), Nash -walras equilibria were introduced and existence was proved under strong assumptions. The failure of these assumptions, which occurs naturally in economic settings, is the focus of the argument here.
Equilibria may fail to exist for two reasons: (1) market clearing in contracts need not imply market clearing in commodities; this is due to the individual specific deliv-eries on contracts that vary with the actions of individuals; (2) the utility functions of individuals need not be quasi -concave in their choice variables, their trades in contracts and their actions, even if the underlying utilities over bundles of commodities are quasi -concave, and their choice sets need not be convex; this is the case in economies with asymmetric information.
Nash -walras equilibria exist in large economies as long as the actions of individuals do not affect the payoffs of contracts they purchase; they may affect the deliveries on contracts they sell.
The economy and equilibrium
Actions are a ∈ A, a non -empty, compact metric space. Distributions of actions are ν ∈ ∆(A). The matrix of payoffs of contracts purchased by an individual, which does not vary with the action of the individual, is
The net trade in commodities by an individual is
Prices of contracts are q = (. . . , q m , . . .).
The budget set of an individual varies with (q, R, ν), the prices of contracts, the matrix of payoffs of contracts and the distribution of actions; the budget set of an individual with characteristics (u, D) is
where C = A × Θ × Φ × Z is the set of choices of individuals.
An individual chooses (a, θ, φ, z), an action, a sale of contracts, a purchase of contracts and a net trade in commodities, so as to
The set of solutions to the optimization problem of an individual is ψ(u, D, q, M, ν).
The set of bounded, continuous utility functions of individuals is U, and D is the set of continuous functions of deliveries on contracts, both with the supremum norm topology. The set U × D is the set of characteristics of individuals.
An economy is µ ∈ ∆(I), where I ⊂ U × D is a compact subset of characteristics of individuals.
The utility functions of individuals are strictly monotonically increasing in the consumption of commodities:
For (τ, q, R), a joint distribution of characteristics and choices of individuals and prices and payoffs of contracts, the best response set is 
the matrix of payoffs of contracts pools the deliveries on contracts:
I×C φ m dτ * > 0 ⇒ r * l,m = I×C d l,m (a, τ * A )φ m dτ * I×C φ m dτ * ;
the markets for commodities clear:
This is an extension of the notions of a competitive equilibrium for an economy and of a Nash equilibrium for a game to a large set of individuals.
Proposition 1 Nash -walras equilibria exist.
Proof The correspondence β : D, a, θ, φ, z) , and (a n , θ n , φ n , z n ) ∈ ψ(u n , D n , q n , R n , τ A,n ), for n = 1, . . . , while (a, θ, φ, z) ∈ ψ(u, D, q, R, τ A ), there exists a sequence (a n , θ n , φ n , z n ) ∈ β(u n , D n , q n , R n , τ A,n ) that converges to a point (a , θ , φ , z ), with u(a , τ A ) > u(a, τ A ). Since u n (a n , τ A,n ) ≥ u n (a n , τ A,n ), this contradicts the convergence of the sequence (u n : 1, . . .) to u in the supremum norm topology.
then τ I = µ, is compact and convex. The correspondence Φ 1, : ∆ M × R × T → T defined by Φ 1, (q, R, τ ) = {τ ∈ T : τ (B(q, R, τ )) = 1} is non -empty, convex, compact valued and upper hemi -continuous. If a sequence, ((q n , R n , τ n ) : n = 1, . . .), converges to (q, R, τ ), and a sequence, (τ n :
and, for an open set, U, τ (U ) < 1, and B(q, M, τ ) ⊂ U.
Since the correspondence B is upper hemi -continuous, there exists n, such that B(q n , R n , τ n ) ⊂ U, , for n = n, . . . . Since τ n (B(q n , R n , τ n )) = 1, while the sequence (τ n : n = 1, . . .) converges weakly, τ (B(q n , R n , τ n )) = 1. But then, τ (U ) = 1, a contradiction.
The function Φ 2, : T → R is defined by
where R ∈ R is a fixed matrix of payoffs of contracts, and the correspondence Φ 3, :
non -empty, convex, compact valued and upper hemi -continuous; therefore, it has a fixed point, (q , r , τ ). For = 1/n, the sequence of fixed points is ((q n , D n , τ n ) : n = M + 1, . . . , ).
Since ∆ M and R are compact, without loss of generality the sequence of prices of contracts and matrices of payoffs of contracts, ((q n , R n ) :
Since q I×C (θ − φ)dτ ≤ 0, for all q ∈ ∆ M , and, in particular for 
so that, at the limit, I×C zdτ * = 0.
Since R * ∈ R, there exists a contract, m, a commodity l, and n l,m , such that
, there exists n m , such that every individual has a feasible trade preferred to any bounded trade, which contradicts optimization at q n ,
, then there exists η > 0 and (a , θ , φ , z ) with
, and q * (θ − φ ) = −ηq * m < 0. Convex combinations and the continuity of the utility function, u, imply that there exists n, such that this contradicts optimization at q n , for n = n, . . . . ✷
Remarks
The model is versatile and encompasses diverse situations; in particular, large markets under asymmetric information.
1
The existence of Nash -walras equilibria is based on the separation of the purchase from the sale of contracts and the pooling of the deliveries on contracts. This idea was introduced and developed in Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990) for the existence of general competitive equilibria when individuals can default on their promises; this encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Moral hazard and non -convexities in the optimization problems of individuals lead to an analytically equivalent problem for the existence of competitive equilibria, to which separation and pooling provide a solution; this was pointed out and developed in . Earlier references to the idea of pooling can be found in Younès (1990) and in Gale (1992).
2
The description of a large game or a large economy in terms of the distribution of individuals' characteristics and actions as opposed to measurable functions on a measure space of "names"is an abstraction and a generalization; it does away with any reference to individuals, and it allows the flexibility of specification necessary to avoid mixed strategies or market clearing only on average, which are problematic. For walrasian equilibria, Hart, Hildenbrand and Kohlberg (1974) and Hildenbrand (1974) developed the argument in terms of distributions and contrasted it with the argument in terms of measurable functions in Aumann (1964) ; the analogous argument for Nash equilibria was developed in Mas -Colell (1984) in contrast with Schmeidler (1973) . An equilibrium joint distribution of characteristics and choices of individuals, τ * , is symmetric if there is a measurable function from the set of characteristics to the set of choices of individuals, h
Mas -Colell (1984) proves that a symmetric equilibrium distribution exists if the set of actions, A, is finite and the measure that describes the game, µ, is atomless, as in Schmeidler (1973) . If the utility functions of individuals and the payoffs of assets depend only on a finite number of moments of the distribution of actions, the set of actions is a compact subset of a euclidean space, and the measure that describes the economy is atomless, symmetric Nash -walras equilibria exist. The difficulty in extending the argument to utility functions and payoffs that depend on the distribution of actions as opposed to finitely many moments comes from the fact that the lyapunov convexity theorem for the range of vector valued measures applies to measures with a range of finite dimension.
3
The existence and optimality of competitive equilibria in a model that encompasses the well known instances of economies with adverse selection, moral hazard, signaling, monitoring, default and incomplete contracts is the subject of Bisin, Geanakoplos, Gottardi, Minelli and Polemarchakis (1999). An individual directly chooses the matrix of deliveries on contracts: A = R and D(a, ν) = a; discretion over deliveries on contracts does not vary across individuals and, more importantly, deliveries on contracts do not vary with the distribution of actions.
Team production, as in Holmström (1982) , and relative performance evaluation, as in Green and Stokey (1983) , are instances where deliveries on contracts by an individual vary with the actions of other individuals.
4
The formulation in Prescott and Townsend (1984 a, b) restricts individuals trades in commodities to a set Z, such that, if all others choose actionā that corresponds to truth telling, it is optimal for an individual to choose a, as well. The formulation is not robust to joint deviations in trades and actions.
5
At a Nash -walras equilibrium, the structure of contracts at equilibrium is, in part, endogenous, since it is determined by the actions of individuals; and it may result in inefficient outcomes. The second best problem of interest in this setting is the design of contracts so as to maximize welfare at equilibrium, taking into account that individuals will then trade competitively, and, simultaneously, they will choose, strategically, actions that affect the payoffs of contracts.
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